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Abstract 
This paper develops a theoretical framework for comparing religious ethics (from Christianity, 
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam) and secular ethics (based on duties vs. rights, current vs. 
future generations, humans vs. non-humans, intra- vs. inter-generational equity, teleological vs. 
deontological perspectives, anthropocentrism vs. biocentrism, cooperative vs. bargaining solutions, 
weak vs. strong sustainability, optimistic vs. current scenarios). I focused on the duties to nature (β) 
and future generations (γ), rights of future generations (δ), and aversion to intra- and inter-
generational inequality (ε and ζ, respectively). To perform this analysis, I adopt an individual 
perspective to favor comparisons between religious and secular ethics. I also consider future 
scenarios for consumption preferences (α), population size (η), and improved technology (θ). I 
present empirical results for OECD and non-OECD countries, based on numerical simulations for 
current and maximum feasible parameter values and on statistical analyses for marginal reliable 
changes of parameters, within a single graphical framework. α, η, and θ are unessential for 
sustainability; β is beneficial but not feasible and unreliable in OECD countries; γ is detrimental in 
all countries; δ is beneficial, feasible and reliable in OECD countries, but inadequate; ε is 
detrimental and ζ is essential in all countries. The religious ethics were adequate, feasible and 
reliable for Hinduism or Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism. 
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1.Introduction 
Both developed countries (here, OECD) and less-developed countries (here, non-OECD) are 
currently environmentally unsustainable. The per capita ecological footprint in 2012 was 5.74 ha for 
OECD countries and 2.14 ha for non-OECD countries, versus a global sustainable value of 1.70 ha 
(http://www.footprintnetwork.org). 
Trusting in future development of green technologies to create sustainability is uncertain and 
unrealistic: the technology of OECD countries would need to become 3.37 times more efficient, 
versus 1.25 times for non-OECD countries. Moreover, relying on future changes of consumption 
preferences is uncertain and questionable (e.g., happy de-growth may be unrealistic). Finally, 
trusting in future population decreases is uncertain and controversial: based on the abovementioned 
ecological footprint data, the population in developed nations would have to decrease to 30% of the 
current population, whereas the population in less-developed nations would need to decrease to 
79% of the current population. 
Unfortunately, the increasing damage caused by climate change suggests that global sustainability 
is an urgent problem (www.sdgindex.org/reports/2018). In other words, even if technology can be 
improved rapidly, consumption preferences can be changed, and populations begin to decrease, we 
cannot afford to wait for these processes. 
The literature has recently begun to emphasize the role of ethics in achieving global environmental 
sustainability (Menning, 2016; Lenzi, 2017; Spahn, 2018). In particular, two main groups of 
environmental ethics can be identified: secular ethics and religious ethics (Zagonari, 2018a). 
Secular ethics focus on our responsibility to nature, responsibility to future generations, perceptions 
of the rights of human and non-humans, and beliefs in inter- and intra-generational equity. Note that 
responsibility to nature and non-humans can be direct (teleological biocentrism based on 
consequences rather than actions if non-humans are believed to have desires and hopes; 
deontological biocentrism based on actions rather than consequences if nature has an intrinsic 
value) (Coyne, 2017). It may instead be anthropocentric and indirect (teleological based on 
utilitarian or eudemonistic approaches; deontological based on freedom or virtue) (Svoboda, 2014; 
Gansmo Jakobsen, 2017). It may also be based on intrinsic and extrinsic views (Keitsch, 2018); on 
love, respect, honor, and cherished attitudes (James, 2016); on experiences with nature (Rush, 
2015); on emotional responses to nature (Kasperbauer, 2015); on a basic belief in continuity 
between humans and other living things (Diehm, 2014); on a constitutive view (Altshuler, 2014); or 
on relational values (Arias-Arevalo et al., 2017). Here, I focus my analysis at an individual level, 
based on national-level statistics for a representative individual, and this approach does not require 
endorsement of a specific version of responsibility to nature; instead, my approach identifies the 
intrinsic value of nature using the perceived human responsibility to nature or the willingness to pay 
for its existence. Moreover, I will base responsibility to future generations on freedom or virtue 
under deontological anthropocentrism. This is consistent with the focus of this study, as ethics 
guides personal choices (i.e., actions). Finally, the rights of non-humans include the right of species 
(i.e., speciesism), the right of non-humans experiencing pain and suffering (i.e., sentientism), and 
the right of any life form (Saner and Bordt, 2016). By attaching value to each individual plant or 
animal (Campbell, 2018), to communities (Kortetmaki, 2017), or to biological diversity and 
ecological integrity (Mikkelson and Chapman, 2014), these rights can extend from small to large 
ecosystems. 
However, the rights of non-humans are not universally accepted (e.g., secular legislation is required 
to protect them) and even when they are acknowledged, this may not contribute to nature 
conservation (i.e., it is unnecessary to consider the rights of individual organisms in conservation 
planning). I will therefore focus on perceptions of the rights of future generations (Brincat, 2015), 
although this might also require legislation to protect these generations and agents who are willing 
to enforce that legislation on their behalf. It may also require the specification of logically possible 
and realistically feasible ways to compensate future generations for damage to their rights; for 
example, restoration of an extinct species might be logically possible but realistically unfeasible, 
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even if the current generation has recorded its complete genome (Donoso, 2017). In particular, I 
will adopt an operational definition of rights by assigning an economic value to the missed 
enforcement of these rights (Almassi, 2017).  
Religious ethics has a different focus in each religion. For example, we could say that Judaism 
focuses on stewardship (here, maximizing the use of resources to achieve the highest sustainable 
total welfare), Islam focuses on trusteeship and parsimony (here, minimizing the use of resources), 
Hinduism and Buddhism focus on maintaining equilibrium, and Christianity focuses on love of 
neighbors. Zagonari (2018b) provides a more nuanced description of these focuses and their ethical 
values based on a close reading of the sacred texts of these religions. Note that the moral standing 
of future generations derives from a divine figure or deity in all religions. Moreover, some ethical 
principles are shared by some religions (e.g., stewardship and trusteeship are similar). Finally, the 
moral standing of nature derives from a divine figure or deity in all religions, although to a different 
extent; this ranges from any life form in Hinduism or Buddhism, to species in Islam, Judaism, and 
Christianity. 
However, the observed failures of international agreements on climate change suggest that the 
unsustainability of global society is a practical problem (i.e., one related to actual practice rather 
than to beliefs; www.sdgindex.org/overview). In other words, it is not enough for an ethical 
principle or precept to be consistent and to be intended to move the world away from unsustainable 
practices; the principle or precept must also provide feasible (i.e., effective and practical) and 
reliable (i.e., unfailing and trustworthy) incentives to achieve sustainability through the application 
of consistent ethical concepts to achieve realistic equilibrium conditions. This can potentially be 
achieved using empirical models that predict the consequences of applying these ethical concepts 
and incentives. 
The purpose of this study is to identify which aspects of secular and religious ethics can help us to 
achieve global sustainability in the form of a realistic equilibrium. To do so, I use empirical models 
based on theoretical frameworks to quantify the effects of various secular and environmental ethics 
to determine which are feasible (i.e., could effectively guide behavior) and reliable (i.e., will 
unfailingly produce the expected result), under the current context and in an optimistic future 
perspectives. To perform this analysis, I focused on representative individuals in developed nations 
(for simplicity, represented by OECD countries) and less-developed nations (non-OECD countries). 
By evaluating ethical principles and precepts in terms of their feasibility and reliability, I will also 
seek consensus among religions and cultures to reduce conflicts among diverging worldviews by 
clarifying the impacts and definitions of the alternative ethics. 
Note that Zagonari (2018a) and Zagonari (2018b) characterize the main secular and religious ethics, 
respectively, while a summary of the analytical frameworks for secular and religious ethics are 
presented in Appendix I and II, respectively. 
2.Methods 
Insights presented in this study are based on six concepts (Section 2.1), six parameters (Section 
2.2), and six equilibria (Section 2.3). 
2.1.Solutions, equilibria and paradigms 
The analytical framework is based on six concepts that represent the main solutions and paradigms. 
I assume: 
1. A Nash bargaining solution for welfare, in which OECD and non-OECD countries both exploit 
the potential gains from cooperation in terms of the current status or a future sustainable status. 
2. A Kalai-Smorodinski bargaining solution for resources, in which OECD and non-OECD 
countries accept the same proportional losses to move towards a long-run equilibrium. 
3. A Rawls equilibrium for resources, in which OECD and non-OECD countries aim to achieve a 
sustainable status that protects the poorest people). 
4. Cooperative solutions for welfare and resources in which OECD and non-OECD countries 
pursue a common goal subject to common constraints. 
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5. Strong sustainability: future generations will have access to at least the same amount of 
resources available to the current generation. I will consider four versions: one with weighted 
population, one with maximum aversion to intra-generational inequality, one with minimum 
aversion to intra-generational inequality, and one with a cooperative weighted use of Earth’s 
resources. 
6. Weak sustainability: future generations will enjoy at least the same level of welfare enjoyed by 
the current generation, but under a sustainable equilibrium. I will consider four versions: one 
with weighted population, one with maximum aversion to intra-generational inequality, one with 
minimum aversion to intra-generational inequality, and one with a cooperative weighted level of 
world welfare. 
Note that I could have applied a Nash solution for resources and a Kalai-Smorodinski solution for 
welfare, but it is more realistic that countries bargain on potential gains in welfare and accept 
relative losses in resources. However, since both OECD and non-OECD countries know that 
achieving global sustainability implies losses on both sides, these two bargaining equilibria, 
together with the Rawls equilibrium, within an individualist contractualism approach, are the most 
appropriate options in the present context, which is assumed to be static because the focus is on 
feasibility of long-run equilibria rather than short-run processes. 
2.2.Ethical changes 
The analytical framework is also based on six parameters that represent the main ethical changes: 
1. α represents the proportion (values from 0 to 1) of income spent on consumption, and measures 
the relative effect of consumption on welfare. 
2. β represents the proportion (values from 0 to 1) of income spent on nature conservation and 
preservation, and measures the perceived responsibility to nature. 
3. γ represents the proportion (values from 0 to 1) of income spent on green R&D, and measures 
the perceived responsibility for future generations. 
4. δ represents the proportion (values from 0 to 1) of income charged for environmentally 
unsustainable activities, and measures the opportunity cost of the current global unsustainability; 
it reflects the “polluter pays” principle. 
5. ε (a dimensionless value between 0 and 1) represents the aversion to intra-generational 
inequality, and depicts the perception of inequality in the distribution of Earth’s resources 
6. ζ (a dimensionless value between 0 and 1) represents the aversion to inter-generational 
inequality, and depicts a philosophical approach to human dignity. 
Note that I will look for numerical solutions with the parameters fixed at current levels (i.e., α0, β0, 
γ0, and δ0) and at the maximum levels for both OECD and non-OECD countries. Moreover, 
changing the relative importance attached to consumption could take long time; thus, I will simulate 
a change in α only for future generations. Finally, I will assume that intra-generational equity has 
instrumental value (i.e., equality reduces social conflicts or improves social cohesion), whereas 
inter-generational equity has intrinsic value (i.e., future generations are perceived as being as 
important as current generations). In particular, I have depicted the maximum β and γ as 1 minus 
the proportions of income currently spent on the other two parameters (i.e., max β = 1 – α0 – γ0 and 
max γ = 1 – α0 – β0). Moreover, the maximum δ represents the payment to be charged to an 
individual in future generations at a sustainable level of activity if the current level of 
unsustainability is achieved. Finally, I will couple the maximum value of ζ (i.e., ζ  = 1), which 
represents a constant level of human dignity over time and the precautionary principle, with ε at 
both its minimum level (i.e., ε = 0) and its maximum level (i.e., ε = 1), where the latter value depicts 
a reduction of the use of Earth’s resources to protect the least privileged people. 
2.3.Equilibrium environmental solutions 
I defined the following six equilibrium conditions for the main environmental solutions: 
1. Judaism, which corresponds to the maximum current welfare consistent with future sustainability 
2. Islam, which corresponds to the minimum use of resources consistent with current welfare 
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3. Buddhism or Hinduism, which correspond to the Rawls equilibrium 
4. Nash equilibrium in terms of the current use of resources, which corresponds to the most realistic 
equilibrium, since countries are likely to bargain today in terms of current welfare 
5. Cooperative equilibrium in terms of resources, although this is a speculative equilibrium, since 
countries are unlikely to achieve an agreement that maximizes efficiency in world resources, 
regardless of resource distributions: I will retain to show what countries are renouncing to 
6. Cooperative equilibrium in terms of welfare, although this is an unlikely equilibrium, since 
countries are unlikely to achieve an agreement that maximizes welfare from world resources, 
regardless of welfare distributions: I will retain to show what countries are renouncing to 
Note that I did not refer to Christian equilibria, since these appear not to be supported by either 
theoretical or empirical insights. Moreover, for simplicity, I will depict only the most likely Kalai-
Smorodinsky equilibria (e.g., to move from the current status to the Rawls equilibrium), and I will 
not represent Nash equilibria in terms of the strong sustainability status with maximum aversion to 
intra-generational inequality, since they always coincide with the Rawls equilibrium. Finally, I did 
not use intermediate values for changes in the ethical parameters (i.e., β, γ, and δ), since the 
maximum changes reveal the potential outcome more clearly. Indeed, the solutions of the model are 
continuous so this approach does not omit any important intermediate equilibria. 
Uncertainty about the future is depicted by optimistic scenarios, where “optimistic” means a 20% 
reduction in population so that the per capita ecological footprint in equilibrium (η) increases, a 
20% improvement in technology (θ) so that a smaller amount of resources is used to produce the 
same amount of consumption goods, and a 20% reduction in the relative importance of 
consumption (α) so the same level of welfare can be achieved by relying on sources other than 
consumption (e.g., enjoying spare time in wild landscapes). 
Note that larger changes seem unrealistic, since the global environmental sustainability problem 
must be solved in the near future. 
3.The dataset 
Some parameters of the models on ethics can be directly estimated. In particular, the proportions of 
the world’s current population in OECD and non-OECD countries based on World Bank world 
development indicators (http://data.worldbank.org) for 2012 are 0.18 and 0.82 for OECD and non-
OECD countries, respectively. If the per capita use of the global environment is measured by the 
ecological footprint (i.e., the biologically productive area needed to provide everything an 
individual uses), the sustainability of a representative individual for the world at the current 
population level requires the ecological footprint to be at η = 1.70 ha 
(http://www.footprintnetwork.org), whereas the values for actual use of the environment in OECD 
and non-OECD countries, based on data for 2012, are 5.74 and 2.14 ha, respectively. 
The actual individual consumption as a percentage of GDP (α) is available for each OECD country 
(55.3% on average) and each non-OECD country (69.0% on average) (http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org). Similarly, the actual revenues to the government from environmental taxes, fees, or 
charges as a percentage of GDP (δ), which accounts for the rights of future generations, are 
available for each OECD country (2.4% on average) and each non-OECD country (1.7% on 
average) (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org). 
The degree of concern about the use of the environment (β) is based on the observed average 
government expenditure on environmental protection as a percentage of GDP (i.e., 1.8% on average 
in OECD countries and 2.6% on average in non-OECD countries) (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org). 
Similarly, the current generation’s concern for future generations (γ) is based on the observed 
expenditures on environmental R&D and patents as a percentage of GDP (i.e., 2.0% on average in 
OECD countries; 0.4% on average in non-OECD countries) (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org). 
Some parameters of the ethics models require additional assumptions or manipulations. In 
particular, the future population was normalized to 1. In other words, I compare representative 
individuals for the current and future world, with a change in the future population depicted by a 
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change in the sustainable per-capita ecological footprint. Future consumption preferences are 
assumed to be an average of the preferences of the current OECD and non-OECD generations. 
The future generations can rely on the environmental technology currently being applied by the 
OECD countries. In other words, complete technology transfer between developed and less-
developed nations is optimistically assumed to be implemented in the future. Indeed, some 
technological convergence is likely to occur, although it is impossible to quantify the degree of this 
convergence. Moreover, a future technology that represents an average of the capabilities of current 
technologies seems to be more plausible in the case of a specified group of countries at similar 
levels of development. Finally, this assumption does not affect the solutions for the strong 
sustainability paradigm, but makes the solutions for the weak sustainability paradigm less feasible. 
Without significant loss of generality, I will assume that the per capita consumption can be 
measured by the per capita income (i.e., GDP in USD, based on purchasing power parity [PPP]). 
Indeed, postponed consumption (as a saving or investment) affects the welfare of future 
generations, but this welfare increase contributes to the current generation’s utility (i.e., both 
developed and less-developed countries’ utility depend on the future utility). Moreover, the 
consumption of imported goods (typically, in OECD countries) increases welfare where they are 
consumed, but their production might increase the use of the environment and thus reduce welfare 
where they are produced and then exported (typically, in non-OECD countries). Finally, net exports 
equal net imports at the world level. Thus, the per capita consumption levels in OECD and non-
OECD countries, based on world development indicators data for 2012, are US$36 727 GDP PPP 
and US$8216 GDP PPP, respectively. 
The parameters of the religion models can be directly estimated. I identified all countries where a 
given religion accounted for more than 50% of the total population in 2010 based on the CIA World 
FactBook (www.cia.gov). This approach identified 40 Muslim countries (i.e., Afghanistan, Albania, 
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Yemen), 8 Hindu or Buddhist countries (i.e., Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Laos, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand); 1 Jewish country (i.e., Israel); 83 Christian countries (i.e., Argentina, Armenia, 
Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Malawi, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe). 
4.Results 
Table 1 summarizes the scenarios that I examined and where the corresponding results are shown. 
Table 1. Summary of scenarios and locations of the numerical results. 
 
 Duty to nature 
Max β 
Duty to future generations 
Max γ 
Rights of future generations 
Max δ 
 
 Without rights 
δ = δ0 
With rights 
Max δ 
Without rights 
δ = δ0 
With rights 
Max δ 
 
Current 
scenario 
Figure 1 Figure 3 Figure A1 Figure 4 Figure A2 Figure 5 
Future 
scenario 
Figure 2 Figure A3  Figure A4  Figure 6 
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Note that Table 1 represents all meaningful scenarios, since β and γ are complementary to 1 for a 
given α (i.e., α, β and γ sum up to 1), and both β and γ may or may not be coupled with a change in 
δ. 
4.1.Scenarios without ethical changes 
Without ethical changes (i.e., with constant duty to nature and future generations and constant rights 
of future generations), Figure 1 represents the solutions for the current status and Figure 2 
represents a scenario with changes in the technology, population, and consumption preferences.  
Figure 1. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with no change in the perceived duty to nature (β), and in the perceived duty to future 
generations (γ), in the perceived rights of future generations (δ), in the current scenario with no change in future 
technology (θ), in future population (η), and in future consumption preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (1.70, 1.70); the Islamic solution (green point) is at (0.28, 8.13); the 
Jewish solution (blue point) is at (1.79, 1.24); the Nash solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 5.74); the strong 
sustainability cooperative solution (purple point) is at (1.90, 0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the 
weighted global sustainability; the decreasing (blue) curve represents equal welfare for the current and future 
generations under weak sustainability equilibrium; the increasing (blue) straight line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky 
equilibrium; the horizontal pink line depicts equal welfare for OECD current and future generations; the vertical grey 
line depicts equal welfare for non-OECD current and future generations. 
 
 
Figure 1 suggests that the current status is weak sustainability if ε = 0, but not if ε = 1. In other 
words, aversion to intra-generational inequality provides incentives towards global sustainability. 
Moreover, the Jewish solution, based on maximizing the use of resources to achieve the highest 
sustainable total welfare, is more egalitarian than the Islamic solution, based on minimizing the 
sustainable use of resources to achieve the given current welfare levels. In practice, the Islamic 
solution is easier to implement (i.e., each individual is expected to reduce their use of resources), 
but is harder to support theoretically (i.e., the current unequal distribution of welfare between 
developed and less-developed countries is taken as given). Finally, cooperative strong sustainability 
is achieved by allocating a larger proportion of resources to less-developed countries, whereas the 
weak sustainability cooperative solution is not feasible. 
Statistical analysis (Section 4.3) based on the marginal impacts (i.e., the marginal change in the 
ecological footprint due to the prevailing majority religion) supports the feasibility and reliability of 
the depicted religious ethics: they are all feasible (i.e., all regression coefficients have negative 
signs), although they are characterized by different reliability: for Hinduism or Buddhism, P > 
0.314; for Islam, P > 0.362; for Judaism, P > 0.481. 
Comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1 suggests that the optimistic future scenario reduces incentives to 
change the current unsustainable status. Indeed, the current use of resources turns out to be weakly 
sustainable to a larger extent and at all aversions to intra-generational inequality (i.e., at both ε = 0 
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and ε = 1). Moreover, cooperative strong sustainability suggests that only less-developed countries 
should use more resources (i.e., the ecological footprint should increase from 1.90 to 2.31 
ha/person). Finally, an optimistic future scenario makes both cooperative strong sustainability and 
Rawls solutions weakly sustainable. 
Figure 2. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with no change in the perceived duty to nature (β), in the perceived duty to future 
generations (γ), and in the perceived rights of future generations (δ), in the optimistic scenario with a 20% 
improvement in future technology (θ), a 20% reduction in future population (η), and a 20% decrease in future 
consumption preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (2.04, 2.04); the Islamic solution (green point) is at (9.64, 0.37); the 
Jewish solution (blue point) is at (1.42, 2.17); the Nash solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 5.74); the strong 
sustainability cooperative solution (purple point) is at (2.31, 0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the 
weighted global sustainability; the decreasing (blue) curve represents equal welfare for the current and future 
generations under weak sustainability equilibrium; the increasing (blue) straight line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky 
equilibrium; the horizontal pink line depicts equal welfare for OECD current and future generations; the vertical grey 
line depicts equal welfare for non-OECD current and future generations. 
 
 
In summary, an optimistic future scenario provides additional support for maintaining the current 
unsustainable status. 
4.2.Scenarios with ethical changes 
Figure 3 shows the solutions with maximum perceived duty to nature, but with current perceived 
duty to future generations and rights of future generations. Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 1 
suggests that achieving the maximum responsibility to nature (i.e., the maximum perception of the 
intrinsic value of nature) makes the current use of Earth’s resources weakly unsustainable to a 
larger extent and for all aversions to intra-generational inequality (i.e., at both ε = 0 and ε = 1). 
However, these value changes do not affect the position of the Nash bargaining equilibrium. In 
other words, individuals in developed and less-developed countries are unlikely to change their 
environmental behavior. Note that the Islamic solution is not feasible. Figure A1 shows the results 
of maximizing both the duty to nature and the rights of future generations. Statistical analysis 
(Section 4.4) based on marginal impacts (i.e., the marginal change in the ecological footprint due to 
changes in responsibilities) supports these insights based on the maximum changes; that is, an 
increase in the duty to nature is beneficial, but insufficient to achieve strong sustainability. Indeed, 
β is beneficial but unfeasible and unreliable (P > 0.871) in OECD countries, but detrimental, 
unfeasible, and reliable (P > 0.334) in non-OECD countries. In other words, nature conservation 
functions as a luxury good (i.e., β is only beneficial in the developed countries). 
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Comparing Figure A1 with Figure 3 suggests that coupling a greater value for the rights of future 
generations (here, the maximum value) with a greater responsibility to nature (here, the maximum 
value) does not affect the positions of the equilibria. 
Figure 3. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with the maximum change in the perceived duty to nature (β), no change in the 
perceived duty to future generations (γ) and in the perceived rights of future generations (δ), in the current 
scenario with no change in future technology (θ), in future population (η), and in future consumption 
preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (1.70, 1.70); the Jewish solution (blue point) is at (1.95, 0.51); the 
Nash solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 5.74); the strong sustainability cooperative solution (purple point) is at (1.90, 
0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the weighted global sustainability; the increasing (blue) straight 
line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium; the vertical grey line depicts equal welfare for non-OECD current and 
future generations.. 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the solutions with current perceived duty to nature and rights of future generations, 
but with maximum perceived duty to future generations. Comparing Figure 4 with Figure 1 
suggests that a greater responsibility to future generations (here, the maximum value) makes the 
current use of Earth’s resources weakly sustainable to a larger extent at all aversions to intra-
generational inequality (i.e., at both ε = 0 and ε = 1). Indeed, the static model developed in this 
paper, together with the assumption that future generations will be sustainable, implies that a larger 
amount of resources can be used by the current generation. An alternative dynamic model might 
highlight a positive relationship between γ at time t and θ at time t+1. However, these value changes 
do not affect the position of the Nash bargaining equilibrium. In other words, individuals in 
developed and less-developed countries are unlikely to change their environmental behavior. 
Figure 4. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with no change in the perceived duty to nature (β), the maximum change in the 
perceived duty to future generations (γ), no change in the perceived rights of future generations (δ), in the 
current scenario with no change in future technology (θ), in future population (η), and in future consumption 
preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (1.70, 1.70); the Islamic solution (green point) is at (1.81, 1.19); the 
Jewish solution (blue point) is at (1.79, 1.67); the Nash solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 5.74); the strong 
sustainability cooperative solution (purple point) is at (1.90, 0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the 
weighted global sustainability; the decreasing (blue) curve represents equal welfare of the current and future generations 
under weak sustainability equilibrium; the increasing (blue) straight line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium; the 
horizontal pink line depicts equal welfare for OECD current and future generations; the vertical grey line depicts equal 
welfare for non-OECD current and future generations. 
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Note that the Islamic solution becomes more egalitarian, with larger resources available for the less-
developed countries, whereas the Jewish solution becomes almost identical to the Buddhist and 
Hindus solution. 
Figure A2 shows the solutions with the current perceived duty to nature, and the maximum 
perceived duty to future generations and rights of future generations. Comparing Figure A2 with 
Figure 4 suggests that coupling a greater perception of the rights of future generations (here, the 
maximum) with a greater perceived responsibility to future generations (here, the maximum) does 
not affect the position of the Nash bargaining equilibrium. However, the weak sustainability 
cooperative solution is now feasible, and the Jewish solution is now more egalitarian than the 
Islamic solution. Statistical analysis (Section 4.4) based on marginal impacts (i.e., the marginal 
change in the ecological footprint due to changes in responsibilities) supports these insights based 
on the maximum changes; that is, an increase in responsibility to future generations is detrimental. 
Indeed, γ is detrimental but feasible and reliable (P > 0.581 and P > 0.170) in both developed and 
less-developed countries (i.e., γ is detrimental in all countries). 
Figure 5 shows the solutions for a scenario with current perceived duty to nature and perception of a 
duty to future generations, but with the maximum perception of the rights of future generations. 
Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 1 suggests that a greater perception of the rights of future 
generations (here, the maximum) moves the bargaining Nash equilibrium in a beneficial direction. 
Note that only developed countries will accept decreased availability of natural resources. 
Moreover, the new bargaining Nash equilibrium is not weakly sustainable at all levels of aversion to 
intra-generational inequality. Finally, the Islamic solution becomes less egalitarian. Statistical 
analysis (Section 4.4) based on marginal impacts (i.e., the marginal change in the ecological 
footprint due to changes in rights) supports these insights based on the maximum changes; that is, 
an increase in the rights of future generations is beneficial. Indeed, δ is beneficial and both feasible 
and reliable (P > 0.629) in OECD countries, although inadequate, and is beneficial but unfeasible 
and unreliable (P > 0.996) in non-OECD countries. 
Figure 5. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with no change in the perceived duty to nature (β) and in the perceived duty to future 
generations (γ), the maximum change in the perceived rights of future generations (δ), in the current scenario 
with no change in future technology (θ), in future population (η), and in future consumption preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (1.70, 1.70); the Islamic solution (green point) is at (1.56, 2.33); the 
Jewish solution (blue point) is at (1.95, 0.53); the Nash solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 4.44); the strong 
sustainability cooperative solution (purple point) is at (1.90, 0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the 
weighted global sustainability; the decreasing (blue) curve represents equal welfare of the current and future generations 
under weak sustainability equilibrium; the increasing (blue) straight line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium; the 
horizontal pink line depicts equal welfare for OECD current and future generations; the vertical grey line depicts equal 
welfare for non-OECD current and future generations. 
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Figure A3 shows the solutions with the maximum perceived duty to nature, but the current 
perceived duty to nature and rights of future generations in a future optimistic scenario. Comparing 
Figure A3 with Figure 3 suggests that responsibility to nature is less effective with a future 
optimistic scenario, since the current use of Earth’s resources is weakly sustainable to a larger 
extent in this scenario. Figure A4 shows the solutions with no perceived duty to nature and no rights 
of future generations, but with the maximum perceived duty to future generations in a future 
optimistic scenario. Comparing Figure A4 with Figure 4 suggests that responsibility to future 
generations in a future optimistic scenario is more detrimental with a future optimistic scenario, 
since all future equilibria become weakly sustainable to a larger extent.  
Figure 6. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with no change in the perceived duty to nature (β) and in the perceived duty to future 
generations (γ), the maximum change in the perceived rights of future generations (δ), in the optimistic scenario 
with a 20% improvement in future technology (θ), a 20% reduction in future population (η), and a 20% decrease 
in future consumption preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (2.04, 2.04); the Islamic solution (green point) is at (1.09, 6.33); the 
Jewish solution (blue point) is at (0.32, 9.84); the Nash solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 1.81); the weak 
sustainability cooperative solutions (pink point) is at (4.65, 3.04); the strong sustainability cooperative solution (purple 
point) is at (2.31, 0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the weighted global sustainability; the increasing 
and decreasing (blue) curve represents equal welfare of the current and future generations under weak sustainability 
equilibrium; the increasing (blue) straight line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium; the horizontal pink line 
depicts equal welfare for OECD current and future generations; the vertical grey line depicts equal welfare for non-
OECD current and future generations. 
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Figure 6 shows the solutions with no changes in the perceived duty to nature or future generations 
but the maximum perceived rights of future generations in a future optimistic scenario. Comparing 
Figure 6 with Figure 5 suggests that maximizing the rights of future generations in a future 
optimistic scenario is more effective than in the current scenario. Indeed, the Nash bargaining 
solution becomes strongly sustainable, and the weak sustainability cooperative solution is now 
feasible. Note that only developed countries will have decreased availability of natural resources, 
whereas the Jewish solution becomes less egalitarian than the Islamic solution. 
In summary, apart from corroboration of the rights of future generations by the maximum charge 
for environmentally unsustainable activities in an optimistic future scenario, secular ethics turn out 
to be inadequate for achieving global sustainability, unless individuals and governments become 
aware that the outcomes of disagreement (i.e., the welfare obtained if one decides not to bargain 
with the other participants) is not the current status, but rather more equal per capita use of the 
Earth’s resources. In particular, weak sustainability cooperative solutions are a small proportion of 
all feasible equilibria. Moreover, secular ethics might affect inequality of the Jewish and Islamic 
solutions, although not their sustainability. Finally, accounting for the rights of future generations 
will make the developed countries bear most of the costs of sustainability. 
4.3.Statistical analysis for religious ethics 
In this analysis, I performed linear regression using estimated the following equation: 
ln 𝐸𝐹 =  ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝐵𝑈𝐷 𝐻𝐼𝑁⁄ + 𝐼𝑆𝐿 + 𝐽𝑈𝐷 + 𝐶𝐻𝑅 +  𝜉 
Where ξ represents the residuals. Note that there were 13 countries where no religion accounted for 
more than 50% of the total population. Table 2 presents the results of this analysis. 
Table 2. Statistical results. 
 
In summary, in terms of the sign of the result and its statistical significance, Buddhism or Hinduism 
(bud/hin) > Islam (isl) > Judaism (jud) > Christianity (chr). The positive sign of the dummy variable 
for Judaism is theoretically justified by Zagonari (2018b). 
4.4.Statistical analysis for secular ethics 
In this analysis, I performed linear regression using the following equation separately for OECD 
and non-OECD countries: 
ln 𝐸𝐹 =  ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + β + γ + δ +  ξ 
Where ξ represents the residuals. Note that there are 33 OECD countries, since Iceland was 
excluded from the 34 OECD countries in 2012 due to a lack of data., Moreover, in this analysis, 
endogenous problems can be excluded, since the dependent variable (i.e., the ecological footprint, 
EF) is expressed in area units (i.e., ha), whereas the independent variables (i.e., β, γ, and δ) are 
expressed in percentages (i.e., values between 0 and 1), and represent endogenous political 
decisions (e.g., the environmental tax rate could either increase or decrease the pollution level). 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.557305   .1013284   -15.37   0.000    -1.757649   -1.356961
         chr     -.000919   .0390526    -0.02   0.981    -.0781329    .0762949
         jud     .1084827   .1536622     0.71   0.481    -.1953348    .4123002
         isl    -.0384913   .0420894    -0.91   0.362    -.1217096     .044727
      budhin    -.0644674   .0638445    -1.01   0.314    -.1906993    .0617645
       lngdp     .4991936   .0241188    20.70   0.000     .4515065    .5468807
                                                                              
        lnef        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     13.821225   144  .095980729           Root MSE      =  .14871
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7696
    Residual    3.07382149   139  .022113824           R-squared     =  0.7776
       Model    10.7474035     5  2.14948071           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   139) =   97.20
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     145
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Finally, the analytical approximation of the logarithmic expressions presented above affects the 
magnitude of the estimation of δ, but not its sign and significance. Table 3 presents the results of 
this analysis for the OECD countries. For simplicity, and with full recognition that this approach 
ignores some exceptions, I have used the subscript N (northern hemisphere) to label parameters for 
OECD countries and the subscript S (southern hemisphere) for non-OECD countries. 
Table 3. Statistical results for the developed countries. 
 
In summary, together with a negative and significant constant and a positive and significant 
coefficient for GDP, similar to estimations for religious ethics, the sign and significance of the 
results was γN (detrimental and significant) > βN ≈ 0 (beneficial but non-significant) > δN (beneficial 
and significant). Table 4 presents the results of this analysis for the non-OECD countries. 
Table 4. Statistical results for the less-developed countries. 
 
In summary, in terms of sign and significance γS (detrimental and significant) > βS ≈ 0 (detrimental 
and non-significant) > δS (beneficial and non-significant). Note that βN < 0 whereas βS > 0: that is, 
the environment can be considered to function as a luxury good. Moreover, δS is non-significant 
whereas δN is significant: that is, the rights of future generations are effective only in the developed 
countries. Finally, both γN and γS are detrimental and significant: that is, a greater investment in 
R&D implies greater use of resources, and the opposite implication (i.e., from large use of resources 
to large R&D) is excluded, since R&D decisions are taken years before R&D expenditures. In other 
words, within a static model, a greener technology that is available today allows the current 
generation to increase its use of resources, based on the belief that future generations are more 
likely to be sustainable tomorrow. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -5.299215   1.272448    -4.16   0.000    -7.905707   -2.692723
         den    -.0199112   .0407201    -0.49   0.629    -.1033226    .0635001
         gan     .0251808   .0451371     0.56   0.581    -.0672782    .1176399
         ben    -.0063982   .0390049    -0.16   0.871    -.0862961    .0734997
      lngdpn     .6691525   .1232108     5.43   0.000     .4167666    .9215384
                                                                              
       lnefn        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.62354922    32  .113235913           Root MSE      =  .23678
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5049
    Residual    1.56979583    28  .056064137           R-squared     =  0.5668
       Model    2.05375339     4  .513438347           Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F(  4,    28) =    9.16
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      33
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.175824   .3003074   -10.58   0.000    -3.771148   -2.580499
         des    -.0001254   .0277826    -0.00   0.996    -.0552013    .0549504
         gas     .1478731   .1070159     1.38   0.170    -.0642736    .3600197
         bes     .0569742   .0586674     0.97   0.334    -.0593272    .1732755
      lngdps     .4395853   .0361459    12.16   0.000     .3679303    .5112403
                                                                              
       lnefs        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    42.3566946   111  .381591843           Root MSE      =    .362
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6566
    Residual    14.0215074   107  .131042125           R-squared     =  0.6690
       Model    28.3351872     4   7.0837968           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   107) =   54.06
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     112
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5.Discussion 
Results obtained above support the statement that ethical principles and precepts must be accounted 
for by empirical models, the assumption that the suggested equilibria must be realistic, and the 
statement that the advocated ethical principles and precepts must be feasible and reliable. Indeed, 
almost all ethical principles and precepts can favor sustainability solutions, but many caveats will 
appear if real data are used. For example, the current status turns out to be weakly sustainable if 
inequality among countries is disregarded (i.e., ε = 0): under these conditions, some people might 
say that we do not need to do anything to improve the current situation. Similarly, if optimistic 
future scenarios apply (i.e., α decreases by 20%, η increases by 20%, and θ increases by 20%), the 
strong sustainable equilibrium is also weakly sustainable: under these circumstances, some people 
might say that there is no point in sacrificing our use of resources or our welfare today to change 
our future from one sustainable equilibrium to another. Due to the many arguable issues involved in 
defining the equilibrium conditions (e.g., inter-generational equity focused on past and present 
generations), the political discussion should focus on realistic goals. For example, a cooperative 
solution to achieve global strong sustainability is not currently feasible, since the perception that we 
face a common problem is still lacking. Similarly, a bargaining Nash equilibrium in terms of the 
strong sustainability status is not currently feasible, since the perception that we face a dramatic 
problem is still lacking. By contrast, the focus on a bargaining Nash equilibrium (i.e., the maximum 
exploitation of potential bargaining outcomes) in terms of the current status or on a bargaining 
Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium (i.e., equally proportional losses by all parties) are realistic goals. 
Note that the set of paired values for the ecological footprints of OECD and non-OECD countries 
that supports weak sustainability increases in size with increasing γ, decreases with increasing β, δ, 
and ε, and increases with an optimistic future scenario. 
The present study has the following methodological weaknesses: 
 I depicted a dynamic problem using a static framework in which sustainability might not be 
achieved in some years, provided it is achieved in many or most subsequent years. However, the 
only acceptable time discount rate for nature conservation in the long-run is 0 (Heath, 2017), so 
that the sustainability problem consists of an infinite number of static problems. 
 I presented both numerical solutions and statistical analyses in scenarios with extreme parameter 
values (i.e., the maximum and minimum aversions to intra- and inter-generational inequality). 
However, continuity and monotonicity of all the applied functions (Zagonari, 2018a) suggest that 
solutions for intermediate parameter values exist and lie between the presented solutions. 
The present study has the following methodological strengths: 
 I formalized all of the essential concepts involved in global sustainability in a single framework. 
This makes it possible to confirm the reliability and feasibility of potential solutions, and to 
avoid discussion of unrealistic concepts. 
 I calculated both the feasibility (i.e., numerical results for the maximum values) and the 
reliability (i.e., statistical results for the marginal impacts) of the solutions, and these calculations 
turned out to be mutually supportive. This suggests that the methodologies are adequate and can 
provide realistic solutions. 
The present study has the following political weaknesses: 
 The analysis is based on national-level statistics for a representative individual. However, a 
downscaling of the analysis to focus on ecosystems, as has recently been accomplished 
(Erickson, 2016), is a promising development. 
 I adopted an individual-level approach. However, an extension of the analysis to community 
approaches (Drahos and Downie, 2017) seems likely to be useful. 
The present study has the following political strengths: 
 Relying on different religious precepts for each religion does not require coordination of 
environmental policies at an international level (Welsch and Kuhling, 2017), and these 
prescriptions can be applied immediately (Castiglione et al., 2014). 
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 The global problem of sustainability must be tackled by involving the vast majority of the 
world’s population (Riley and Bauman, 2017), and some 85% of the world’s people claim to 
believe in some religion and its principles (www.adherents.com). 
Note that this study compares secular and religious ethics, with the former based on ethical 
principles that could solve a perceived social problem such as global sustainability, whereas the 
latter checks whether individual religious precepts can achieve an equilibrium to improve a 
situation that is not perceived as a social problem. 
6.Conclusion 
The application of an empirical model to achieve realistic equilibria by relying on feasible and 
reliable ethical changes suggests that secular ethics is inadequate to achieve global sustainability. In 
particular, I empirically highlighted that α, η, and θ are not essential for achieving sustainability; β 
is beneficial but unfeasible and unreliable in OECD countries, but is detrimental, unfeasible, and 
unreliable in non-OECD countries; γ is detrimental but feasible and reliable in all countries; δ is 
beneficial, feasible, and reliable in OECD countries, but is inadequate, but is beneficial, unfeasible 
and unreliable in non-OECD countries; ε is detrimental; and ζ is essential. 
Therefore, religious ethics (Hinduism or Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism) must be supported as 
feasible and reliable incentives to achieve sustainability, although they may be characterized by 
different levels of intra-generational inequality. This is important because of the huge numbers of 
individuals in all countries who claim to follow the tenets of some religion, and achieving 
sustainability requires a change in behaviors of the vast majority of the world population. Moreover, 
the present results agree with previous suggestions that secular ethics have counterintuitive effects 
on sustainability (Baumard and Boyer, 2013) and that they cannot support prescriptions (Snyder, 
2017). Finally, many religions propose an infinite after-life penalty for unethical behavior and 
reward for ethical behavior that could strongly motivate individual choices, which I implicitly 
accounted for in the present model. 
The application of an empirical model to achieve realistic equilibria by relying on feasible and 
reliable ethical changes can also favor consensus by clarifying often-misinterpreted concepts (e.g., 
ε), by eliminating divisive concepts (e.g., α, η, θ), and by clarifying often-overlooked concepts (e.g., 
γ). 
In particular, the figures in this paper clarify some concepts that are theoretically problematic. It 
turns out that a higher concern for intra-generational inequality (ε) makes environmental 
sustainability harder to achieve. Similarly, changes in consumption preferences (α) and population 
reduction (η) were insufficient to achieve strong sustainability, even when they are combined in a 
potential solution. The figures also clarify a concept that might be theoretically and practically 
problematic. Specifically, a higher concern for future generations (γ) could lead to two unintended 
outcomes. If the current generation thinks that future generations will achieve long-run 
sustainability in some way (e.g., reduced consumption, technological improvements, population 
reduction), then an increase in γ could increase their current use of natural resources because they 
feel no need to change. Similarly, if an increase in γ leads the current generation to invest in green 
technologies, the current status could be perceived as more sustainable, and the current use of 
natural resources could increase due to the belief that technology can solve the problem. 
Despite these clarifications, secular ethics is not a straightforward concept, as it depends on many 
debatable and uncertain factors, and can therefore be modified by politicians to achieve a political 
advantage. For example, they include: 
 Discussion of the sustainability concepts to be pursued (e.g., why should I sacrifice my 
opportunities if my activities are already weakly sustainable?) or political perspectives to be 
adopted (e.g., why should I be concerned about intra-generational equity?) 
 Uncertainty about future generations (e.g., why should I sacrifice my opportunities if future 
generations will rely on greener technologies?). Moreover, “what if future generations are less 
concerned with consumption?” Finally, “why should I sacrifice my opportunities if future 
generations will realize that a reduction in population is required?” 
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 Debate about past responsibilities at a national level (e.g., why should my country adopt 
measures that reduce my opportunities if your country polluted much more than we are doing in 
the past) and current strategies at a national level (e.g., why should my country adopt measures 
that reduce my opportunities if you have no incentive to meet your commitments in the future?). 
To respond to these problems, religious ethics must be supported, as the religious ethics defined in 
this study are based on a few clear precepts grounded in standardized sacred texts. 
Therefore, even if the concern for future generations is maximized, the recognition that 
environmental conservation has opportunity costs suggests that many cooperative or non-
cooperative theoretically feasible sustainable agreements, based on the political and social 
institutions that currently exist, will be difficult to achieve in practice unless individual 
environmental behavior can be changed to promote such agreements. Thus, the environmental 
precepts of each religion should be emphasized for residents of countries dominated by a given 
religion. Because the present results show different results for different religions, supporting inter-
religious dialogue to combine the benefits of the different precepts seems likely to be more 
promising than fostering international agreements based solely on secular ethics. 
Appendix I: the analytical framework for secular ethics 
Zagonari (2018a) justifies the mathematical description of environmental ethical principles. Here, I 
will refer to the following equilibria (again, for simplicity, I have used the subscript N (northern 
hemisphere) to label parameters for OECD countries and the subscript S (southern hemisphere) for 
non-OECD countries; the subscripts C and F refer to current and future generations, respectively): 
For weak sustainability, if ε = 0 and ζ = 1 (pink points in the Figures): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈C = 𝑝N𝑈N + 𝑝S𝑈S 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑈C ≥ 𝑈F 
Where 
𝑈N = 𝑋N
αN𝐸N
−βN𝑈F
γN − 𝛿N(𝐸N − η) 
𝑈S = 𝑋S
αS𝐸S
−βS𝑈F
γS − 𝛿S(𝐸S − η) 
𝑈F = 𝑋F
αF 
𝑋N = θN𝐸N 
𝑋S = θS𝐸S 
𝑋F = θF η 
Note that welfare levels (here, expressed as the utility) are weighted according to the relative 
population sizes (i.e., pN and pS in the OECD and non-OECD countries, respectively). Moreover, α, 
β, and γ are expressed as real numbers in [0, 1], since these parameters represent the proportion of 
income spent on the related items (i.e., consumption, nature conservation, and green R&D, 
respectively). Finally, δ represents the opportunity cost in welfare terms per unit of unmet rights of 
future generations; because this parameter is multiplied by the difference between the current status 
and the sustainability status, it is then added to a welfare measure. 
If ε = ζ = 1 (the horizontal pink line and vertical grey line, respectively, in the Figures): 
𝑈N = 𝑈F and 𝑈S = 𝑈F 
If ε = 0 and ζ = 1 (the decreasing blue curve in the Figures): 
𝑝N𝑈N + 𝑝S𝑈S = 𝑈F 
For strong sustainability, if ε = 0 and ζ = 1 (purple points in the Figures): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸N + 𝐸S 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑝N𝐸N + 𝑝S𝐸S ≤ 𝐸F = 𝜂 
Note that the use of resources is not weighted. 
If ε = ζ = 1 (grey points in the Figures): 
𝐸N = 𝜂 and 𝐸S = 𝜂 
If ε = 0 and ζ = 1 (decreasing green straight line in the Figures): 
𝑝N𝐸N + 𝑝S𝐸S = 𝐸F = 𝜂 
The Nash bargaining solution in terms of the current status is based on: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 [𝑈N + 𝑈N(5.74)] [𝑈S + 𝑈S(2.14)] 
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The Nash bargaining solution in terms of the strong sustainability status with maximum aversion to 
intra-generational inequality is based on: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 [𝑈N + 𝑈N(𝜂)] [𝑈S + 𝑈S(𝜂)] 
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is based on: 
(5.74 − 𝐸N) (5.74 − 𝜂)⁄ = (2.14 − 𝐸S) (2.14 − 𝜂)⁄  
Note that I distinguished responsibilities (here, represented by percentages as parameters of a Cobb-
Douglas utility function) from rights (here, represented by a linear penalty function) to solve for the 
maximum estimated rights in terms of opportunity costs that depend on the variables and 
parameters. 
Appendix II: the analytical framework for religious ethics 
Zagonari (2018b) justifies the mathematical description of the environmental religious precepts. 
Here, I will refer to the following equilibria (again, for simplicity, I have used the subscript N 
(northern hemisphere) to label parameters for OECD countries and the subscript S (southern 
hemisphere) for non-OECD countries; the subscripts C and F refer to current and future 
generations, respectively): 
For Judaism: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑈 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝐸C ≤ η with ζ = 1 and ε = 0 
where: 
𝑈 = {[(𝑝N𝑈N)
1−ε + (𝑝S𝑈S)
1−ε](1−ζ)/(1−ε) + 𝑈F
1−ζ}
1/(1−ζ)
 
Thus (blue points in the Figures): 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑝N𝑈N + 𝑝S𝑈S 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝐸C = 𝑝N𝐸N + 𝑝S𝐸S ≤ η 
Note that welfare levels are weighted by the relative population. 
For Islam: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐸C 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑈N ≥ 𝑢N and 𝑈S ≥ 𝑢S and 𝐸C ≤ η with ε = 0 
Where: 
𝐸C = 𝑝N𝐸N + 𝑝S𝐸S 
With uN and uS the welfare levels currently achieved by developed and less-developed countries, 
respectively. Thus (green points in the Figures): 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑝N𝐸N + 𝑝S𝐸S 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑈N + 𝑈S ≥ 𝑢N + 𝑢S and 𝐸C ≤ η 
For Buddhism and Hinduism: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝐸N ≤ η and 𝐸S ≤ η with ζ = 1 and ε = 1 
Where: 
𝑊 = {[𝐸N
1−ε + 𝐸S
1−ε]
(1−ζ)/(1−ε)
+ 𝐸F
1−ζ}
1/(1−ζ)
 
Thus (grey points in the Figures): 
𝐸N = η and 𝐸S = η 
Appendix III: sensitivity analysis 
Figure A1. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with the maximum change in the perceived duty to nature (β), no change in the 
perceived duty to future generations (γ), with the maximum change in the perceived rights of future generations 
(δ), in the current scenario with no change in future technology (θ), in future population (η), and in future 
consumption preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (1.70, 1.70); Jewish solution (blue point) is at (1.95, 0.51); Nash 
solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 5.74); strong sustainability cooperative solution (purple point) is at (1.90, 0.78); the 
decreasing (green) straight line represents the weighted global sustainability; the increasing (blue) straight line 
represents Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium; the vertical grey line depicts equal welfare for non-OECD current and 
future generations. 
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Figure A2. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with no change in the perceived duty to nature (β), the maximum change in the 
perceived duty to future generations (γ), with the maximum change in the perceived rights of future generations 
(δ), in the current scenario with no change in future technology (θ), in future population (η), and in future 
consumption preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (1.70, 1.70); the Islamic solution (green point) is at (1.92, 0.68); the 
Jewish solution (blue point) is at (0.44, 7.43); the Nash solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 5.74); the weak 
sustainability cooperative solution (pink point) is at (4.66, 1.65); the strong sustainability cooperative solution (purple 
point) is at (1.90, 0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the weighted global sustainability; the decreasing 
(blue) curve represents equal welfare of the current and future generations under weak sustainability equilibrium; the 
increasing (blue) straight line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium; the horizontal pink line depicts equal welfare 
for OECD current and future generations; the vertical grey line depicts equal welfare for non-OECD current and future 
generations. 
 
Figure A3. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with the maximum change in the perceived duty to nature (β), no change in the 
perceived duty to future generations (γ) and in the perceived rights of future generations (δ), in the optimistic 
scenario with a 20% improvement in future technology (θ), a 20% reduction in future population (η), and a 20% 
decrease in future consumption preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (2.04, 2.04);the Jewish solution (blue point) is at (2.35, 0.58); the 
Nash solution (magenta point) is at (2.14, 5.74); the strong sustainability cooperative solution (purple point) is at (2.31, 
0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the weighted global sustainability; the decreasing (blue) curve 
represents equal welfare of the current and future generations under weak sustainability equilibrium; the increasing 
(blue) straight line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium; the vertical grey line depicts equal welfare for non-
OECD current and future generations. 
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Figure A4. Solutions for combinations of the ecological footprint (ha/person) for less-developed (Eldc) and 
developed countries (Edc) with no change in the perceived duty to nature (β), the maximum change in the 
perceived duty to future generations (γ), no change in the perceived rights of future generations (δ), in the 
optimistic scenario with a 20% improvement in future technology (θ), a 20% reduction in future population (η), 
and a 20% decrease in future consumption preferences (α). 
The Hindu and Buddhist solution (grey point) is at (2.04, 2.04); the Islamic solution (green point) is at (2.26, 1.02); the 
Jewish solution (blue point) is at (2.04, 1.99); the Nash solution (magenta point) is at (5.74, 2.14); the strong 
sustainability cooperative solution (purple point) is at (2.31, 0.78); the decreasing (green) straight line represents the 
weighted global sustainability; the decreasing (blue) curve represents equal welfare of the current and future generations 
under weak sustainability equilibrium; the increasing (blue) straight line represents Kalai-Smorodinsky equilibrium; the 
horizontal pink line depicts equal welfare for OECD current and future generations; the vertical grey line depicts equal 
welfare for non-OECD current and future generations. 
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